When it comes to the Barth-Bonhoeffer relationship, there may be no greater puzzle than what Bonhoeffer meant when he accused Barth of Offenbarungspositivismus, “positivism of revelation” (or “revelatory positivism”), in his Letters and Papers from Prison (DBWE 8).

The phrase shows up in just three letters to Eberhard Bethge, all written in the spring of 1944. Below, I sketch how Barth and Bonhoeffer defined “religion” differently, walk through the three passages, survey how scholars have tried to make sense of them, suggest what the difference in definitions might explain, and then say why I doubt the question can be fully settled.

First, What Did They Mean by “Religion”?

Before reading the letters, it helps to notice that Barth and Bonhoeffer didn’t mean the same thing by “religion.” I’ve argued this at length in “To Be or Not To Be Religious: A Clarification of Karl Barth’s and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Divergence and Convergence Regarding Religion.” Here’s the short version.

Both men inherited a nineteenth-century, post-Kantian understanding of religion from thinkers like Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Harnack. On that view, religion has an essence, belongs inalienably to our humanity, and centers on the experience of the religious subject rather than knowledge of religion’s object. Both rejected it. But they replaced it with different definitions.

Barth defined religion systematically and dialectically. In Church Dogmatics I/2 §17, religion is unbelief: humanity’s attempt to justify itself by putting its own constructions in place of God’s revelation. Religion in this sense is unavoidable. Humans are always religious, and revelation doesn’t abolish religion so much as judge it and take it up into something new (Aufhebung). We can speak of “true religion” only the way we speak of a justified sinner.

Bonhoeffer, in prison, defined religion historically and psychologically. Religion is a historically conditioned way of approaching life: inward, individualistic, metaphysical, and partial. It keeps God at the margins and calls on him as a stopgap when human resources run out. Because it is a historical phenomenon, it can pass away. That’s why Bonhoeffer could hope for a “religionless Christianity,” while Barth insisted that we cannot and should not be religionless.

Their critiques still converge. For both, the heart of “religion” is the self-justifying projection of a deity: the impulse to posit and make room for a “God” in order to secure our own identities. But because their definitions differ, Bonhoeffer is measuring Barth’s critique of religion with a different yardstick than Barth used. Keep that in mind as we read the letters.

The Primary Texts

April 30, 1944: “a restoration”

Bonhoeffer first uses the phrase while asking how Christ can be Lord of people who have no use for religion:

How can Christ become Lord of the religionless as well? Is there such a thing as a religionless Christian? If religion is only the garb in which Christianity is clothed—and this garb has looked very different in different ages—what then is religionless Christianity? Barth, who is the only one to have begun thinking along these lines, nevertheless did not pursue these thoughts all the way, did not think them through, but ended up with a positivism of revelation, which in the end essentially remained a restoration. For the working person or any person who is without religion, nothing decisive has been gained here. (DBWE 8:363–64, emphasis added).

The DBWE editors point out two things. Every time Bonhoeffer raises this charge, he first praises Barth’s critique of religion. And the phrase marks the point where Bonhoeffer draws different consequences from that critique than Barth did:

This reproach, “positivism of revelation,” raised here for the first time against Karl Barth (cf. also 3/139, p. 373, and 3/161, p. 429), is consistently preceded by an appreciation for Barth’s critique of religion (for example, 3/139, p. 373: “Barth was the first theologian … to begin the critique of religion”). However, the remarks about “nonreligious interpretation” and “arcane discipline” show that “positivism of revelation” is a programmatic term indicating that in his critique of religion, Bonhoeffer draws other consequences. For the origin of the concept “positivism of revelation” and its significance as a demarcating formula in theology, see Krause, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer,” in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, 64n1; Feil, Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 175–177, with reference to DBWE 6:376–78; Pangritz, Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 76–87; Wüstenberg, Theology of Life, 60–65. (DBWE 8:364n17).

May 5, 1944: “like it or lump it”

This is Bonhoeffer’s most concrete description of the problem. Barth’s positivism treats every doctrine as equally necessary, a package to be accepted or refused as a whole:

What matters is not the beyond but this world, how it is created and preserved, is given laws, reconciled, and renewed. What is beyond this world is meant, in the gospel, to be there for this world—not in the anthropocentric sense of liberal, mystical, pietistic, ethical theology, but in the biblical sense of the creation and the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Barth was the first theologian—to his great and lasting credit—to begin the critique of religion, but he then put in its place a positivist doctrine of revelation that says, in effect, “like it or lump it.” Whether it’s the virgin birth, the Trinity, or anything else, all are equally significant and necessary parts of the whole, which must be swallowed whole or not at all. That’s not biblical. There are degrees of cognition and degrees of significance. That means an “arcane discipline” must be reestablished, through which the mysteries of the Christian faith are sheltered against profanation. The positivism of revelation is too easygoing, since in the end it sets up a law of faith and tears up what is—through Christ’s becoming flesh!—a gift for us. Now the church stands in the place of religion—that in itself is biblical—but the world is left to its own devices, as it were, to rely on itself. That is the error. At the moment I am thinking about how the concepts of repentance, faith, justification, rebirth, and sanctification should be reinterpreted in a “worldly” way—in the Old Testament sense and in the sense of John 1:14. I’ll write you more about it. (DBWE 8:373, emphasis added).

A translation question

“Now the church stands in the place of religion” translates “An der Stelle der Religion steht nun die Kirche” (DBW 8:416). For a long time I couldn’t tell whether this meant:

  • The church is a part of the religious sphere.
  • Or: the church now stands in religion’s spot, in religion’s stead.

Update (November 2026): I’m now fairly confident it’s the second. An der Stelle von is the ordinary German idiom for “in place of” or “instead of.” It’s the same phrase that gives us the preposition anstelle. To place the church inside religion, Bonhoeffer would have needed different wording. So the sentence describes a substitution: Barth’s critique cleared religion away, and the church moved into the space it left. Bonhoeffer calls that much “biblical.” His objection comes in the next clause, where the world is left to rely on itself. That suggests part of what “positivism of revelation” names is a church that has replaced religion but has nothing to say to the world outside it. This lines up with one of the interpretations Greggs lists below.

June 8, 1944: “no concrete guidance”

Here Bonhoeffer pins down where Barth stopped short. Barth never showed how to interpret theological concepts nonreligiously. Bonhoeffer also sets his own position against Bultmann’s: keep the “mythological” content, but interpret it so that religion is not a precondition for faith.

Barth was the first to recognize the error of all these attempts (which were basically all still sailing in the wake of liberal theology, without intending to do so) in that they all aim to save some room for religion in the world or over against the world. He led the God of Jesus Christ forward to battle against religion, πνεῦμα against σάρξ. This remains his greatest merit (the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans, despite all the neo-Kantian eggshells!). Through his later Dogmatics he has put the church in a position to carry this distinction in principle all the way through. It was not in his ethics that he eventually failed, as is often said—his ethical observations, so far as they exist, are as important as his dogmatic ones—but in the nonreligious interpretation of theological concepts he gave no concrete guidance, either in dogmatics or ethics. Here he reaches his limit, and that is why his theology of revelation has become positivist, a “positivism of revelation,” as I call it. To a great extent the Confessing Church now has forgotten all about Barth’s approach and lapsed from positivism into conservative restoration. Its significance is that it holds fast to the great concepts of Christian theology, but it appears to be exhausting itself gradually in the process. Certainly these concepts contain the elements of genuine prophecy (which include the claim to the truth as well as mercy, as you mentioned) and of genuine ritual, and only to that extent does the message of the Confessing Church get attention, a hearing—and rejection. But both remain undeveloped, remote, because they lack interpretation. … As for Bultmann, he seems to have sensed Barth’s limitation somehow, but misunderstands it in the sense of liberal theology, and thus falls into typical liberal reductionism (the “mythological” elements in Christianity are taken out, thus reducing Christianity to its “essence”). My view, however, is that the full content, including the “mythological” concepts, must remain—the New Testament is not a mythological dressing up of a universal truth, but this mythology (resurrection and so forth) is the thing itself!—but that these concepts must now be interpreted in a way that does not make religion the condition for faith (cf. the περιτομή in Paul!). Only then, in my opinion, is liberal theology overcome (which still determines even Barth, if only in a negative way), but at the same time the question it asks is really taken up and answered (which is not the case with the Confessing Church’s positivism of revelation!). The fact that the world has come of age is no longer an occasion for polemics and apologetics, but is now actually better understood than it understands itself, namely, from the gospel and from Christ. (DBWE 8:428–31).

The Secondary Literature

Those are the primary texts. Proposed explanations of them have multiplied since 1944. Tom Greggs sums up the state of the question:

There is the scope for a monograph which attended singularly to the vast array of interpretations scholars have offered with regard to the way in which one should understand Bonhoeffer’s three word (one in German) charge. Indeed, there is almost as much (if not more) reflection on this than the meaning of religionlessness and non-religious interpretation.

He then surveys the interpretations on offer. I’ve broken his paragraph into bullet points, but the wording is his:

  • For some theologians, the charge is aimed more at Barthians and the Confessing Church than Barth himself.
  • Others see it as arising from a degree of misunderstanding on the part of Bonhoeffer of Barth’s purpose.
  • For others, it revolves around a shift towards existential thinking on Bonhoeffer’s part, compared to Barth’s overarching systematic principle of christology which swallows up all else.
  • Still others consider the meaning to relate to the distinctive christological method of Bonhoeffer compared to the trinitarian method of Barth.
  • Some have suggested the ultimately positive role of religion in Barth in terms of leading humans to grace, or the philosophical distinction between a theologian who is influenced primarily by Feuerbach, Freud and Marx (Barth), compared to one influenced primarily by Nietzsche (Bonhoeffer).
  • Others point to the influence of the philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, on Bonhoeffer during the period of his prison writings.
  • For some, the issue is the dominant influence of Luther on Bonhoeffer compared to Calvin on Barth, particularly over the issue of the extra Calvinisticum.
  • Still others see the issue as resting in the positive meaning of ‘religion’ for the two theologians, with Bonhoeffer adopting an ‘operational or behavioural’ concept of religion in comparison to a ‘morphological or institutional’ one.
  • For others, it is Barth’s ‘all or nothing’ approach that should be emphasized, especially around the issue of the virgin birth, as being at the heart of ‘positivism of revelation’.
  • For others, the matter is Barth’s inability to relate revelation to the world, or his strong distinction of the church from the world.
  • At stake in some interpretations is Bonhoeffer’s unpreparedness to create a theory of religion (and his critique of Barth’s doing so), and the related issue of religion being a hamartiological concept for Barth compared to an historical concept for Bonhoeffer.
  • Still others analyse the distinction between Bonhoeffer and Barth in terms of different emphases in their theological approach—on the secondary objectivity of God in the former, and the primary objectivity of God in the latter.

(Theology against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth, 56–58.)

Greggs’ Proposal: Bonhoeffer Wants More Barth, Not Less

Greggs’ own explanation reads the charge in light of Schleiermacher:

One possible way of understanding Bonhoeffer’s charge against Barth is to see it in relation to the theological father of liberalism, Friedrich Schleiermacher. It may well be that Bonhoeffer believed that Barth was ultimately influenced (if negatively) by liberal theology, and that Barth was still allowing his work to be defined by the confines of liberal thought. Considering this point might help to unpack what Bonhoeffer meant by positivism of revelation, and to demonstrate that Bonhoeffer is seeking to be even more Barthian than Barth, rather than engaging in a different agenda. (Greggs, 61).

Here’s how he spells out the payoff:

What, then, does this mean for Bonhoeffer’s charge against Barth of ‘positivism of revelation’? Firstly, it relates to the accusation of the ‘take it or leave it’ nature of revelation which, according to Bonhoeffer, exists in Barth’s work. Positivism points to the givenness of the individual instantiation of Christianity, its unique stand-aloneness which separates it not only from other religions but also from the world. Secondly, and more fiercely, it seems that Bonhoeffer’s term suggests a logical flaw in Barth’s doctrine of revelation which separates it off from all other potential engagements external to itself, creating a self-enclosed circle, self-sufficient in its entirety. The argument of this would go thus: the positive aspect of a religion is its individuality and distinctiveness from all else. The cause of this (according to Schleiermacher) is revelation. Barth seems to agree with Schleiermacher in his presentation to some degree, since revelation contradicts religion. But, for Barth, the very thing which is distinctive is not only caused by revelation, but is revelation. In other words, according to Bonhoeffer’s critique of ‘positivism of revelation’, Barth says something akin to ‘revelation makes Christianity a positive (unique) religion, and what is revealed is that Christianity is a religion which arises in some way out of revelation: the positivism of the Christianity, which is caused by revelation, is, thereby, revelation.’ Thus, revelation, rather than being the means of establishing the distinctiveness of Christianity becomes the beginning and the end. (Greggs, 63).

Put more simply: for Schleiermacher, revelation is what makes a religion “positive,” that is, distinct from every other religion. On Greggs’ reading, Bonhoeffer suspects Barth of collapsing cause into effect. Revelation is no longer what makes Christianity distinctive; it is the distinctive thing. The result is a closed circle, cut off from anything outside itself.

But Greggs doesn’t think the charge ultimately sticks:

However, this presentation fails to do full justice to §17 of Church Dogmatics. As has been seen in Chapter 2, it is not a concept of revelation or even grace which is the Aufhebung of religion, but Jesus Christ Himself. The trueness of Christian religion does not rest in revelation or grace, but its religion is contradicted in the same way in which sin is contradicted, not simply by the revelation of revelation, but by the revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. To a degree, therefore, the charge rests on an insensitive reading of Barth, but nevertheless that reading does not stop Bonhoeffer from sensing that Barth is on the path that he, too, should walk along: it means only that Bonhoeffer does not realize how closely and how much in step he and Barth are walking, and, given the ongoing and dynamic nature of both of their works (see above), this can hardly be a charge of mis-representation. Bonhoeffer builds upon Barth’s indicative description of human religion and optatively hopes for a Christianity which can become religionless: for Bonhoeffer, there is the hope that religion need not be the ‘given’ (positive) for theology. He charges Barth with the task of moving further away from Schleiermacher’s categories—otherwise put, with the task of becoming more intensely Barth. The critique is not a critique against Barth’s constructive work, but a critique of the continued Schleiermacherian categories which Barth still works with as a background: Bonhoeffer does not want less Barth; he wants more. (Greggs, 63-64).

What the Definitions Might Explain

I don’t think the difference in definitions solves the puzzle. But I think it explains more than it first appears to.

On Barth’s definition, the answer to religion is revelation. Revelation judges religious self-justification and takes it up into something new, and the church is where the “true religion” of justified sinners lives. Bonhoeffer agrees with that much. It’s what he means when he says that the church standing in religion’s place “in itself is biblical.”

On Bonhoeffer’s definition, though, religion is a posture that is fading from history, and that raises a different question: how do we speak of God to people who no longer have the religious posture at all? Barth’s definition doesn’t raise that question, so his theology doesn’t answer it. From where Bonhoeffer stood, the result looks like a critique of religion that leaves the church’s language and practices more or less as they were, now underwritten by revelation instead of religious experience. “For the working person or any person who is without religion, nothing decisive has been gained here.” That is a restoration. It also matches the June 8 complaint: Barth gave “no concrete guidance” for nonreligious interpretation.

If that’s right, then “positivism of revelation” is partly what Barth’s critique of religion looks like when it’s measured against Bonhoeffer’s definition of religion. Barth answered the question his definition raised, and Bonhoeffer faulted him for not answering the one Bonhoeffer’s definition raised. That puts me near the readings in Greggs’ list that turn on how each man defined “religion,” and near the one about Barth’s “strong distinction of the church from the world.” It would also explain how Greggs can call the charge an “insensitive reading” of Barth while still concluding that Bonhoeffer wants more Barth, not less.

The definitions don’t explain everything, though. Bonhoeffer’s “like it or lump it” complaint about the virgin birth and the Trinity concerns dogmatic method: whether every doctrine carries equal weight. That has little to do with how either man defined religion, and it’s the part of the charge I find hardest to pin down.

Where This Leaves Me

Beyond that suggestion, this post isn’t the place to evaluate all of these proposals. Suffice it to say that I think (1) no one is really sure what Bonhoeffer meant by positivism of revelation, and (2) the conversation about the Barth-Bonhoeffer relationship would be better off focusing on how Barth and Bonhoeffer actually engaged the Bible, instead of continuing to speculate about what Bonhoeffer’s enigmatic accusation meant.